TUT*  NET* 


?€dce  Lddgue 
or 

War  League’? 


JX 197  S 

.9.  T3* 


/4LM0ST  everybody  believes  in  a league  of  nations;  why 
not  the  League  of  Nations  now  offered  us?  Why  does 
almost  everybody  believe  in  a league  of  nations?  Only  be- 
cause they  believe  in  the  thing  that  they  have  been  told  a 
league  of  nations  will  bring  to  the  world — permanent  peace. 

But  any  league  of  nations  will  not  bring  peace,  however 
loudly  it  may  shout  that  such  is  its  purpose.  There  was  a 
league  known  as  the  Holy  Alliance.  At  the  Congress  of 
Aix-la-Chapelle  it  proclaimed  that  it  had  “no  other  object 
than  the  maintenance  of  peace.  . . . The  repose  of  the 
ivorld  will  be  constantly  our  motive.”  There  are  leagues  of 
nations  and  there  are  leagues  of  nations.  On  September  12, 
1918,  Lloyd  George  announced  that  he  was  “all  for  a league 
of  nations.”  The  formation  of  the  league,  he  said,  was 
already  under  way;  in  fact,  the  British  Empire  was  a league 
of  nations.  So  teas  the  Triple  Entente,  for  that  matter,  and 
the  Triple  Alliance.  All  swore  that  their  aim  was  peace. 

But  the  Holy  Alliance  lived  and  died  in  a welter  of  war; 
the  British  Empire  has  fought  more  wars  than  any  other 
country  in  history;  while  everybody  knows  what  the  Triple 
Entente  and  the  Triple  Alliance  did  to  the  ivorld. 

Is  this  a Peace  League  or  a War  League?  That  is  the 
question. 


Copyright,  1919. 

By  The  Nation  Press,  Inc. 


! oct  i6  is: 

Peace  League  or  War' 
League  ? 

By  JOHN  KENNETH  TURNER 

PRESIDENT  WILSON  never,  of  course,  pretended  that 
any  league  of  nations  would  bring  permanent  peace. 

Instead,  he  informed  us  that  only  one  kind  of  league  would 
do  it.  He  was  careful  to  lay  down  the  plans  and  specifica- 
tions, to  assure  America  that  it  was  fighting  only  for  that 
kind,  to  pledge  himself  to  accept  nothing  else.  Do  we  get 
that  kind  of  league?  Mr.  Wilson  made  it  plain  at  every- 
turn  that  the  genuineness  of  a league  of  nations  as  a league 
of  peace  was  to  be  determined,  first,  by  its  composition.  It 
must  be  a league  of  all  nations  from  the  start.  “A  general 
association  must  be  formed”  (No.  14  of  the  Fourteen 
Points).  “It  cannot  be  formed  now.  If  formed  now,  it 
would  be  merely  a new  alliance  against  the  common  enemy” 
(September  27,  1918).  “She  [the  United  States]  would 
join  no  combination  of  powers  that  is  not  a combination  of 
all  of  us”  (December  30,  1918).  Russia  was  not  excepted, 
nor  Germany,  nor  any  other  friend,  foe,  or  neutral. 

The  second  test  of  a genuine  peace  league  was  to  be  its 
government.  It  must  be  a league  of  absolute  equals,  a pure 
democracy.  “The  essential  principle  of  peace  is  the  actual 
equality  of  nations  in  all  matters  of  right  and  privilege” 
(Inaugural  Address,  1917).  “The  guarantees  exchanged 
must  neither  recognize  nor  imply  a difference  between  big 
nations  and  small,  between  those  that  are  powerful  and 
those  that  are  weak”  (January  22,  1917).  “The  strong  and 
the  weak  shall  fare  alike”  (April  6,  1918).  Inner  circles 
are  a contradiction  of  equality;  so  inner  circles  are  barred. 

There  can  be  no  leagues  or  alliances  or  special  covenants  or 
understandings  within  the  general  and  common  family  of  the 
league  of  nations  (September  27). 

As  a guarantee  against  clandestine  inner  circles,  all  secrecy 
is  barred: 


3 


All  international  agreements  and  treaties  of  every  kind  must 
be  made  known,  in  their  entirety,  to  the  rest  of  the  world 
(September  27). 

For  America,  a pledge  is  offered  in  advance  that  it  shall  be 
a party  to  no  inner  circle,  whether  open  or  secret: 

The  United  States  will  enter  into  no  special  arrangements  or 
understandings  with  particular  nations  (September  27). 

The  third  test  of  a genuine  league  of  peace  was  to  be  its 
obligations.  One  stands  out  above  all  others: 

Mutual  guarantees  of  political  independence  and  territorial 
integrity  to  great  and  small  states  alike  (No.  14  of  the  Fourteen 
Points) . 

Not  guarantees  for  some  states,  remember,  but  for  all: 

The  whole  family  of  nations  will  have  to  guarantee  to  each 
nation  that  no  nation  shall  violate  its  political  independence  or 
its  territorial  integrity.  That  is  the  basis — the  only  conceivable 
basis — for  the  future  peace  of  the  world  (June  7,  1918). 

The  fourth  test  of  a genuine  peace  league  was  to  be  its 
privileges — its  absence  of  special  privilege.  There  must  be 
“a  common  participation  in  a common  benefit”  (January  22, 
1917).  This  means,  for  all,  “a  participation  upon  fair  terms 
in  the  economic  opportunities  of  the  world”  (August  27, 
1917).  This  means  freedom  of  the  seas:  “Absolute  freedom 
of  navigation  upon  the  seas,  outside  territorial  waters,  alike 
in  peace  and  in  war”  (No.  2 of  the  Fourteen  Points).  “The 
freedom  of  the  seas  is  the  sine  qua  non  of  peace,  equality, 
and  cooperation”  (January  22,  1917).  This  means  no  trade 
hostilities : 

Special  alliances  and  economic  rivalries  and  hostilities  have 
been  the  prolific  source  in  the  modern  world  of  the  plans  and 
passions  that  produce  war.  It  would  be  an  insincere  as  well  as 
an  insecure  peace  that  did  not  exclude  them  in  definite  and  bind- 
ing terms  (September  27). 

Finally,  as  a guarantee  against  the  violent  upset  of  our 
genuine  peace  league,  or  any  of  the  fundamentals  thereof, 
by  a minority,  every  state,  however  virtuous,  must  render 
itself  physically  incapable  of  aggression : 

Adequate  guarantees  given  and  taken  that  national  arma- 

4 


ments  will  be  reduced  to  the  lowest  point  consistent  with 
domestic  safety  (No.  4 of  the  Fourteen  Points). 

But  the  League  of  Nations  excludes  all  former  enemies 
and  many  neutrals.  Even  within  itself  it  is  a league  of  un- 
equals. It  has  an  inner  circle,  the  Council;  an  inner  circle 
within  the  Council,  the  Big  Five ; an  inner  circle  within  the 
Big  Five,  France-England- America ; possibly  other  inner 
circles.  No  outside  state  is  guaranteed  against  aggression. 
The  seas  are  less  free  than  ever  in  history.  Economic 
hostilities  have  already  begun.  No  secret  international  en- 
gagement has  been  published — not  even  the  business  under- 
standing for  which  the  Lansing-Ishii  Agreement  is  a blind. 
No  victor  is  reducing  armaments. 

If  the  President’s  League  of  Nations  meets  none  of  his 
prescribed  requirements  for  a genuine  peace  league,  how  is 
it  going  to  secure  the  world’s  peace?  Time,  we  are  told, 
will  correct  all  shortcomings.  But  the  five  gentlemen  who 
framed  the  League  in  secret,  and  who  determined  upon  the 
charter  members,  have  taken  every  precaution  against  time 
correcting  anything.  The  covenant  cannot  be  amended 
without  the  unanimous  consent  of  the  Council.  None  of  the 
Big  Five  can  ever  be  ousted  from  the  Council.  The  As- 
sembly can  never  over-rule  the  Council.  Practically  nothing 
can  be  done  without  the  unanimous  consent  of  the  Council. 
New  members  are  received,  not  on  general  terms  open  to  all 
applicants,  but  on  special  terms  laid  down  to  the  given  ap- 
plicant. No  outsider  may  ever  become  a member  without 
the  unanimous  consent  of  the  Big  Five,  and  on  terms  laid 
down  by  the  Big  Five;  no  outsider,  having  become  a mem- 
ber, may  ever  attain  equality  with  any  of  the  Big  Five  with- 
out the  unanimous  consent  of  the  Big  Five;  they  may  have 
nothing  to  say  in  the  affairs  of  the  Big  Five,  while  the  Big 
Five  may  have  everything  to  say  in  their  affairs.  Any 
reform,  or  other  generous  undertaking,  can  be  blocked  for- 
ever by  a single  member  of  the  Council.  The  covenant  of 
the  President’s  League  of  Nations  makes  it  safe  from 
democracy.  If  the  gentlemen  who  promised  the  world  a 
genuine  league  of  peace  really  intended  to  give  it  to  us,  why 


5 


not  give  it  now,  instead  of  at  some  future  time?  And  why 
should  we  accept  a substitute? 

How,  indeed,  can  anyone  hope  that  this  particular  League 
of  Nations  will  ever  bring  peace  to  the  world  when  its  first 
concern  is  to  guarantee  a settlement  that  everywhere 
tramples  upon  the  fundamentals  of  peace?  The  President 
himself  made  it  plain  that  “the  equality  of  nations  upon 
which  peace  must  be  founded,  if  it  is  to  last,”  was  to  be 
established  not  at  some  future  time,  but  at  once — in  the 
settlement  itself;  that  the  league  was  only  to  give  it  per- 
manency; that  a league  of  equality  could  be  erected  only 
upon  a peace  of  equality.  We  find  that  his  pledges  of  a 
league  of  equals  are  inseparable  from  his  pledges  of  a settle- 
ment of  equals.  Together  they  constitute  the  “Wilson 
terms.”  The  obligation  of  mutual  guarantees  was  simply 
the  application  to  existing  states  of  the  basic  principle  of 
self-determination,  which  he  promised  even  to  subject  peo- 
ples : “We  shall  fight  . . . for  the  privilege  of  men  every- 
where to  choose  their  own  way  of  life  and  obedience”  (War 
Message).  “Self-determination  is  not  a mere  phrase.  It  is  an 
imperative  principle  of  action,  which  statesmen  will  hence- 
forth ignore  at  their  peril”  (February  11,  1918).  As  late 
as  Independence  Day,  1918,  he  gave  the  following  definition 
of  the  process: 

The  settlement  of  every  question,  whether  of  territory,  of 
sovereignty,  of  economic  arrangement,  or  of  political  relation- 
ship, upon  the  basis  of  the  free  acceptance  of  that  settlement 
by  the  people  immediately  concerned,  and  not  on  the  basis  of 
the  material  interest  or  advantage  of  any  other  nation  or  people 
which  may  desire  a different  settlement  for  the  sake  of  its  own 
exterior  influence  or  mastery. 

Of  how  much  importance  to  the  permanency  of  peace,  to 
democracy,  to  the  world,  to  ourselves,  was  the  Wilson  plan 
for  a settlement  of  equals  and  a league  of  equals?  Let 
Wilson  himself  answer.  Here  is  what  he  said  of  it,  January 
22,  1917: 

These  are  American  principles,  American  policies.  We  can 
stand  for  no  others.  And  they  are  also  the  principles  and 
policies  of  forward-looking  men  and  women  everywhere,  of  every 


6 


enlightened  community.  They  are  the  principles  of  mankind 
and  must  prevail. 

Here  is  what  he  said  of  his  Fourteen  Points: 

For  such  arrangements  and  covenants  we  are  willing  to  fight 
until  they  are  achieved;  but  only  because  we  wish  the  right  to 
prevail  and  desire  a just  and  stable  peace  such  as  can  be  secured 
only  by  removing  the  chief  provocations  to  war,  which  this 
programme  does  remove.  . . . An  evident  principle  runs 

through  the  whole  programme  I have  outlined.  It  is  the  prin- 
ciple of  justice  to  all  peoples  and  nationalities,  and  their  right 
to  live  on  equal  terms  of  liberty  and  safety  with  one  another, 
whether  they  be  strong  or  weak.  Unless  this  principle  be  made 
its  foundation,  no  part  of  the  structure  of  international  justice 
can  stand.  The  people  of  the  United  States  could  act  upon  no 
other  principle;  and  to  the  vindication  of  this  principle  they  are 
ready  to  devote  their  lives,  their  honor,  and  everything  they 
possess. 

Of  the  pledges  of  September  27,  he  said : 

They  [the  issues  of  the  struggle]  must  be  settled — by  no 
arrangement  or  compromise  or  adjustment  of  interest,  but  defi- 
nitely and  once  for  all  and  with  a full  and  unequivocal  accept- 
ance of  the  principle  that  the  interest  of  the  weakest  is  as  sacred 
as  the  interest  of  the  strongest.  This  is  what  we  mean  when 
we  speak  of  a permanent  peace,  if  we  speak  sincerely,  in- 
telligently. ...  No  peace  shall  be  obtained  by  any  kind  of 
compromise  or  abatement  of  the  principles  we  have  avowed  as 
the  principles  for  which  we  are  fighting. 

The  President’s  own  words  are  the  best  answer  to  the 
treaty  that  he  now  asks  us  to  approve.  If  you  believe  in  the 
principles  for  which  America  was  persuaded  to  give  seventy- 
five  thousand  lives,  see  two  hundred  thousand  of  its  young 
men  wounded,  pay  out  $150  cash  for  every  man,  woman,  and 
child  of  our  population;  submit  to  soaring  living  costs  and 
countless  forms  of  discipline  and  sacrifice,  you  cannot  believe 
either  in  the  settlement  that  is  offered  us  or  the  League  that 
is  a part  of  it.  If  the  President  really  cares  for  those 
principles,  it  would  be  impossible  for  him  to  offer  us  this 
substitute.  If  we  really  cared  for  them,  it  would  be  im- 
possible for  us  to  accept  this  substitute  from  him.  Is  it  an 
accident  that  certain  neutral  nations  were  not  invited  to 


7 


I 

join  our  League?  That  our  League  does  not  afford  universal 
guarantees  of  political  independence  and  territorial  in- 
tegrity? That  self-determination  is  not  provided  for?  That 
no  adequate  steps  are  taken  toward  a general  reduction  of 
armaments,  that  the  freedom  of  the  seas  is  forgotten,  and 
all  other  essentials  of  a genuine  peace  league  are  lacking? 
Woodrow  Wilson  is  a historian  by  profession.  Did  he  ex- 
pect, after  assisting  England  to  victory,  to  persuade  that 
country  to  surrender  her  dictatorship  of  the  seas,  or  to  cut 
her  navy  to  the  size  of  the  navy  of  America,  France,  or 
Germany?  Did  he  expect  to  persuade  England  to  grant  self- 
determination  to  Ireland,  India,  or  Egypt;  Japan  to  grant 
it  to  Korea ; France  to  grant  it  to  Morocco ; Italy  to  grant 
it  to  Tripoli?  Did  he  himself  ever  intend  to  grant  gen- 
uine self-determination  to  Porto  Ricans,  Filipinos,  Santo 
Domingans,  Nicaraguans,  Virgin  Islanders,  and  to  Haitiens? 
Would  Lloyd  George  have  been  willing  that  his  League  of 
Nations  should  guarantee  Persia  against  aggression  by  Eng- 
land? Would  Orlando  have  been  willing  that  his  League  of 
Nations  should  guarantee  Abyssinia  against  aggression  by 
Italy?  Would  Makino  have  been  willing  that  his  League  of 
Nations  should  guarantee  Siberia  against  aggression  by 
Japan?  Would  Wilson,  indeed,  have  been  willing  that  his 
League  of  Nations  should  guarantee  Mexico  against  aggres- 
sion by  the  United  States? 

Was  our  League  of  Nations  framed  with  a view  to  end- 
ing aggression  upon  weak  states  by  the  great  and  powerful, 
or,  rather,  to  facilitating  and  sanctifying  it?  Will  it,  or 
will  it  not,  afford  America  a freer  hand  for  the  “cleaning 
up”  of  Mexico  for  the  benefit  of  Wall  Street?  There  has 
been  some  complaint  that  America  “gets  nothing”  out  of 
the  European  settlement.  The  rise  in  Mexican  securities  on 
the  Stock  Exchange,  the  feverish  preparations  of  great 
financiers  to  take  immediate  advantage  of  Mexican  “oppor- 
tunities,” together  with  the  artificially  stimulated  outcry 
for  armed  intervention,  argue  a strange  confidence  that  a 
few  of  us  are  about  to  get  something  by  war  in  lieu  of  the 
permanent  peace  that  was  promised  all  of  us. 


